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Reducing Power Losses in Smart
Grids with Cooperative Game
Theory
Javier B. Cabrera, Manuel F. Veiga, Diego X. Morales
and Ricardo Medina
Abstract
In a theoretical framework of game theory, one can distinguish between the
noncooperative and the cooperative game theory. While the theory of noncoopera-
tive games is about modeling competitive behavior, cooperative game theory is
dedicated to the study of cooperation among a number of players. The cooperative
game theory includes mostly two branches: the Nash negotiation and the coalitional
game theory. In this chapter, we restrict our attention to the latter. In recent years,
the concept of efficient management of electric power has become more complex as a
result of the high integration of distributed energy resources in the scenarios to be
considered, mainly distributed generation, energy storage distributed, and demand
management. This situation has been accentuated with the appearance of new con-
sumption elements, such as electric vehicles, which could cause a high impact on
distribution gridworks if they are not managed properly. This chapter presents an
innovative approach toward an efficient energy model through the application of the
theory of cooperative games with transferable utility in which the management,
capacity, and control of distributed energy resources are integrated to provide opti-
mal energy solutions that allow achieving significant savings in associated costs. This
chapter presents a general description of the potential of the application of the theory
to address Smart Grid, providing a systematic treatment.
Keywords: game theory, coalition, cooperative, Smart Grid, power loss
1. Introduction
Electricity consumption has grown in terms of the advances in technology, but
we must bear in mind that this demand for electricity is variable at different times
of the day. It is therefore possible to divide a day into two parts, namely, the
maximum and minimum demand periods [1]. For 1 day, the maximum demand
consists of the most active time of electricity consumption, and the maximum
demand differs depending on the season. If power plants are able to consistently
maintain high power generation, they can meet the maximum demand. However,
the high production of electricity, especially obtained from nonrenewable energy
resources (e.g., thermoelectric power plants), usually wastes a lot of energy. There-
fore, we require a new type of intelligent electrical grid, which can help power
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plants to be more efficient, reliable, and solid, to avoid the generation of unneces-
sary energy and/or loss of energy in the distribution.
Microgrids (MGs) comprising distributed power generators have been intro-
duced recently to construct smart grid to reduce power loss. MGs are able to supply
electricity to the end users (i.e., homes, companies, schools, and so forth) which are
linked to the corresponding MGs [2]. The MGs can exchange power with others. In
addition, they are also capable of transferring power with the macro station (MS),
which is the primary substation of the smart grid. In the presence of MGs, it is
desirable to allow the microgrids to service some small geographical areas or group
of customers based on their demand, so as to relieve the demand on the main grid
[2]. We consider a power network consisting of interconnected microgrids and a
macrogrid. The MGs harvest renewable energy (e.g., wind, solar, etc.), whereas the
macrogrid produces energy from conventional sources. The MGs are equipped with
storage devices (e.g., batteries) in which they can store energy for future usage
locally. Although these resources are easily procurable and depicted as “green”
energy resources, they present a significant shortcoming since they cannot guaran-
tee stable production of electricity at all times [3]. For example [4], solar energy
generation through deployed solar panels in the MGs can be seriously hampered on
rainy days. When a MG needs additional power, it can buy electricity from the
wholesaler (i.e., the MS) and/or from neighboring MGs.
Kantarci et al. proposed the “cost-aware smart microgrid network design,”
which enables economic power transactions within the smart grid [5, 6]. The prob-
lem of power loss minimization was discussed in the work conducted by
Meliopoulos et al. [7, 8] whereby a real-time and coordinated control scheme was
proposed with the participation of distributed generation resources that can be
coordinated with the existing infrastructure [9–11].
Kirthiga et al. proposed a detailed methodology to develop an autonomous
microgrid for addressing power loss in [12]. Furthermore, some researchers have
addressed power loss in the works in [13–15].
At present, game theory is an important tool for microgrid research as described
in the work in [16–18]. Saad et al. presented an algorithm based on the cooperative
game theory to study novel cooperative strategies between the microgrids of a
distribution network [19].
The challenge of the electric companies is to determine the mechanisms that
allow efficiently and quickly the equal distribution of the electric power surren-
dered by the electricity distribution grid as well as the distributed generation and
that the clients or consumers of that energy have a common benefit.
According to the energy current pattern, the chain of the use of the energy was
based on the generation stages, transport, distribution-commercialization, and con-
sumption. This model in some countries differs basically in the form of the electric
market, that is to say, in countries like Ecuador, Venezuela, and Mexico, the market
structure is monopolist which has a single company constituted by subcompanies
denominated as generation company, transmission company, and distribution
companies. The price for the energy is fixed by the institutions of the State that
regulate the electric sector. In other countries, mainly European countries, the
market pattern is based on the free offer on the part of the generation companies,
consumers can choose the company freely to which they want to buy the product,
and the transmissions and distribution companies allow to carry out these trans-
actions acting as intermediaries in the energy sale. From a general perspective, it is
foreseen that the new smart electric grid is a cyber-physical system of a large scale
that can improve the efficiency, dependability, and robustness of the electric grids,
by means of the integration of advanced techniques, as control, communications,
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and signal processing. Intrinsically, the smart electric grid is an energy grid made up
of intelligent nodes that can operate, communicate, and interact, in an autonomous
way, to provide efficient electrical power to its consumers. The heterogeneous
nature of the smart electric grid motivates the adoption of advanced techniques to
overcome the diverse technical challenges in different levels as the design, control,
and implementation.
In this sense, it is expected that the theory of games constitutes an essential
analytic tool in the design of the future smart power grid, as well as in the cyber-
physical systems to a large scale. The theory of games is a formal framework as
much analytic as conceptual with a group of mathematical tools that allow the study
of complex interactions among rational, independent players.
2. Electric system model for a cooperative game
Considering a single macro station denominated by a transmission substation,
this macro station has a group of N Smart Grid, which a certain period of time can
behave as microgrids that have an energy surplus (sellers) or energy requirements
(buyers). Thus, a coalition formed in the grid can have any of these two types of
Smart Grid.
One of the initial hypotheses to consider the exchange pattern based on a coop-
erative game is that all the Smart Grid possesses the information of the grid that
allows choosing one of them. Being part of a specific coalition is always know, and
the link between all and each one of Smart Grid belonging to the certain Macro
station is always feasible, having as a result that all the members of the electric grid
can interact with each other.
A specific electric grid may be made up of a group of Smart Grid, where for the
i-th Smart Grid in a particular frame of time it can be said that this microgrid has a
generated total power called Pi and at the same time a power demand by a group of
consumers that is shown in Di. Therefore, the surplus power to the Smart Grid i∈N
is given by [20]:
Q i ¼ Pi Di (1)
Depending on the power generation values and electrical demand in Smart Grid,
the surplus energy can define three cases to analyze:
• Case 1: Q i>0:In this case, the Smart Grid has a surplus power which makes it
able to sell this electric power (seller) and shaping coalitions with the Smart
Grid or substation.
• Case 2: Q i ¼ 0: In this case, the Smart Grid supplies its consumption.
• Case 3: Q i <0:Here the Smart Grid can buy electric power (buyer) from
another Smart Grid or substation.
It should be kept in mind that both the power generated Pi and the demand Di
are random; the first can rely on the wind speed, solar irradiation intensity, etc.;
and the second would be determined by uses of the energy on the part of the
consumers. This gives rise to the surplus Q i that will also be a random variable in
the Smart Grid. Its value in a point in time will define an agent as a seller or an
energy buyer [20].
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A second hypothesis might bear in mind that the energy exchange will only
happen among the Smart Grid (each other) or the substation. Then it won’t be
deemed the energy exchange with the macrogrid, which means that an electric
possible transmission system will not be considered present [20].
All energy exchange that is carried out either among the Smart Grid and the Smart
Grid and the substation incurs a cost associated with the energy losses in the driver.
The energy losses in the feeders or the electric lines that are connected to each other,
to the Smart Grid or to the substation are a function of the driver's resistance, the
distance of the line, and of the power transmitted by the line in a specific time t.
2.1 Losses of power for the exchange between a Smart Grid and the substation
If a smart grid carries out an energy exchange with the substation, the losses of
power incurred can be determined through Eq. (2) [20]:
P lossi ¼ RioI
2
o þ βPi Q ið Þ (2)
where
Plossi is the losses due to the exchange of power between the substation and the
Smart Grid i∈N.
Rio is the driver’s resistance that joins the substation with the Smart Grid i∈N.
This resistance is calculated as the product of the resistivity per unit length of the
driver in Ω=km½  used to connect both Smart Grid and the distance in km½  between
these elements.
Io is the electric current in A½  that flows through the driver, which joins the
substation with the ith Smart Grid.
β is the coefficient that reflects the fraction of the losses in the transformer by
the substation during the power exchange.
Pi Q ið Þ is the power flow between the substation and the i-th Smart Grid.
It can be said that the power losses associated to the power exchange are made
up of a loss component in the electric line (feeder or sub-transmission line) that
links the substation with the Smart Grid i∈N: The second component is given by
the losses in the substation due to the use of the transformer to carry out the
exchange of power. If it is considered that the electric current through the electric
line of distribution may be calculated from:
Io ¼
Pi Q ið Þ
Uo
, (3)
then, Eq. (2) to determine power losses can be written as an only power flow
function through electric line given by Eq. (4):
P lossi ¼ Rio
Pi Q ið Þ
Uo
 2
þ βPi Q ið Þ (4)
The power flow depends on the kind of the Smart Grid i∈N (buyer or seller);
thus [1]:
Pi Q ið Þ ¼
Q i if Q i>0
Li if Q i <0
0 other cases
8><
>: (5)
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Eq. (4) expresses the next; if a Smart Grid acts as a seller, the power of Q i is
completely sold to the substation; thus the flow power PiQ i corresponds exclusively
to that power, and the power losses are determined by Eq. (4) [20].
On the other hand, if the i-th Smart Grid is a buyer, the power flow will
be generated from the substation that should deliver such a power to solve the
Smart Grid’s power demands and its losses of power incurred for the power
flow. Then the power of Li which should be delivered by the substation is
determined by [20]:
Li ¼ P
loss
io þ P
required
i (6)
where P
required
i ¼ Q i is the power required by the substation’s load and the value
of Li the power flow through the line. When substituting these values from Eq. (4)
to Eq. (6), the expression for the power which should be delivered by the substation
to Smart Grid i∈N is reached [1]:
Li ¼ Rio
Li
Uo
 2
þ βLi Q i (7)
Rio
U2o
L2i  1 βð ÞLi  Q i ¼ 0 (8)
Eq. (8) can present three possible solutions for the variable Li because the same
one corresponds to a quadratic equation.
If the equation presents real positive roots, the root that is the solution will be
the lesser of the two, since it will cause fewer losses. Then the losses through the
distribution line are determined to substitute in Eq. (4) the value of PiQ i ¼ Lij j.
If the equation presents negative roots or it does not have a real solution, the
considered answer is:
L ∗i ¼
1 βð ÞU2o
2Rio
(9)
Then the power losses are calculated substituting L ∗i in Eq. (7).
In either case, if Nb is the total number of buyers present in a certain time, being
Nb⊆N, then it should be fulfilled with the power of the substation at a given
moment that [1]:
X
i∈Nb
Li ≤Psubestation (10)
The value of Li is the power flow which means the demanded power plus the
power loss in the electric lines.
2.2 Power loss in smart grids
Suppose that the energy exchange is carried out between the Smart Grid i∈Nb
denominated buyer, and another Smart Grid j∈Ns called the seller. Since Nb, the
group of all the Smart Grid buyers and the group of all the Smart Grid sellers with
Nb∪Ns¼N; the power losses will be similar to the case of the exchange with the
substation, unless:
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1.The energy exchange does not incur in the use of the transformer substation;
consequently, the loss coefficient is β ¼ 0.
2.The energy exchange between the Smart Grids should not necessarily be
carried out with a voltage Uo but to a lower voltage U1.
Thus, the energy losses for the power flow of a Smart Grid i∈Nb y and another
Smart Grid j∈Ns can be determined from the equation [20]:
Plossij ¼ RijI
2
ij (11)
Since Rij is the total resistance of the driver that joins the i-th Smart Grid buyer
with the jth Smart Grid seller, their value is calculated from Rij ¼ R∙dij, something
akin to an exchange case with the substation.
The current Iij depends on the power flow through the electric line; therefore, as
in the power exchange case with the substation and except for the different voltage
level that is U1, the power losses will be given for [20]:
Plossij ¼ Rij
Pi Q ið Þ
U1
 2
(12)
The power flow Pi Q ið Þ is similarly defined in Eq. (5) where the value of power Li
that supplies the Smart Grid buyer is determined by Eq. (11) with the value β ¼ 0,
getting the following equation [20]:
Rij
U21
L2i  Li  Q i ¼ 0 (13)
The solution of Eq. (13) will result once again in the cases that have been
presented before where there are two different real solutions, a unique real solution,
or no practical solutions. This way if:
Eq. (13) generates two values Li, positive real and different. The lowest value is
chosen since it will produce the fewest losses. The losses due to the power exchange
are determined by (12) when substituting Pi Q ið Þ ¼ Lij j.
On the other hand, Eq. (13) produces real roots, or there is no real solution; the
value that is to be adopted for the power is:
L ∗i ¼
U21
2Rij
(14)
The value L ∗i is replaced in Eq. (12) to determine the losses, since it is the power
sum of the microgrid plus the power losses present during the flow power. The
Smart Grid that acts at this precise point of time like seller will not necessarily cover
the power Q i required by the part of a certain Smart Grid buyer.
2.3 Algorithm for the coalition building in a cooperative game with
transferable utility
To set an algorithm 1 based on [20], considerations and definitions may be
carried out so that the result is a modified algorithm of [20] with the incorporation
of restrictions and hypothesis that simplify the mathematical process and the cal-
culations when carrying out its simulation.
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As it was described in point (2.2), a group Smart Grid S ofN is considered present
in the electric grid linked to a macrogrid through a substation. Thus, a coalition game
is formulated which is formed by the pair N; vð Þ, since N is the total number of
players (Smart Grid) and v : 2N ! ℝ is a function that assigns to a coalition ⊆N a real
number to represent the total benefit reached by S. It must, therefore, define the
value of function v sð Þ assigned to this number or the coalition S⊆N.
The following describes the subroutines that would make up an algorithm,
which will be necessary to set up the simulation that allows determining the game
payment functions, the power loss of electrical grid, and power distribution in the
cooperative exchange based on the resulting coalitions in the game process.
2.3.1 Subroutine for coalition formation
Once the noncooperative exchange is established, the next step is to form the
coalitions which are the generation of cooperative groups to ease substation load
and maximize the Smart Grid’s profitability through the decrease of the losses [20].
Issues that should be considered by the time to begin to carry out the coalitions
are the exchange between the Smart Grid regardless of the substation. Depending
on the distance among Smart Grids in the subsets and at smaller distance minors,
there will be losses; the exchange is carried out at the local level, without the
necessity of the substation, except for it still existing as a surplus or lacking energy
in the coalition and Smart Grid.
At the moment to start developing the coalitions, it is essential to consider that
the exchange between the Smart Grid depends on the distance between the Smart
Grid and the subsets Sb y Ss (at a shorter distance lower will be the losses). The
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exchange is carried out at the local level without the need of the substation except
that an energy surplus or lack of power supply in the coalition and Smart Grid
would be present.
The aim of forming coalitions inside the electric grid is to look for participation
of group N, so the members of group N are creating disjoint subsets, where each
subset Si ⊂N is a coalition [21]. Thus, the participation established will be
S1; S2; S3;⋯; Snf g [1]. As a coalition has a large number of possible combinations, it
is necessary to introduce heuristic elements to simplify the calculations and reduce
the operation number to calculate a conformed partition of a group of coalitions.
The first step is to determine the neighbors [22], defining like a neighboring
coalition Si ⊂N to that one with the shortest distance toward the other coalition
Sj ⊂N. In this point, the first restriction corresponding to the distance between
coalitions appears. This distance is called threshold; dumbral is the shortest distance
that the two coalitions must have between them to be denominated neighbors,
which correspond to the minimal losses of power that should be considered in such
grid, so the energy quality indexes are inside the acceptable systems.
From this approach arises that large-size coalitions will hardly be formed; even a
great coalition that involves all the members of the grid will be formed when the
number of Smart Grid is significant.
Property: For the coalition game presented N; vð Þ, the great coalition of all the
Smart Grid rarely rises as the result of the presence of a series of expenses incurred
by the power exchange, since the longer the distance, the bigger losses the grid will
have. Rather, the disjoint independent coalition will be formed in the grid [22].
Observation: For the proposal of formation game coalitions N; vð Þ, the size of any
coalition Si ⊂ S that will be formed in the grid should satisfy the distance d≤ dthreshold.
The participation that will be carried out in the grid corresponds to merge the
Smart Grid neighbors into a set of pairs in a way that each pair has a seller and a
buyer that is located at the shortest reasonable distance and fulfill the distance
restriction. In this first stage of coalition building, some Smart Grid can be initially
isolated by the dynamics of the game. That means they do not fulfill with distance
restriction, the number of Smart Grid is odd, the number of elements belonging to
the set of the seller is greater or lesser than the number of the elements from the
buyer set, and all the combinations are possible from these alternatives.
The next building coalition process follows the rule of coalition and division to
achieve this; the following additional and necessary concepts are considered to
understand the proposed algorithm.
Definition: Consider two sets of a disjoint independent coalition called
C ¼ C1;C2;C3;⋯;Clf g and K ¼ K1;K2;K3;⋯;Kmf g made by the same players
(Smart Grid) that belong to the grid). Let ϕj Cj
 
be the payment of player j in the
coalition CjϵC, and ϕj K j
 
the payment of player j in the coalition. Then, C is
preferred for the collection K only if the Pareto principle is fulfilled that is shown by
[1, 2]:
C⊳K() ϕj Kð Þ∀ Kð Þ∀j∈ C;K
n o
(15)
or at least just with a single player j that applies this expression.
Definition of the Pareto principle: The principle settles that the group of Smart
GridN prefers to be divided into partition or collection C rather than collection K, if
at least a player can improve his/her profitability when changing the structure of K
to C without reducing the benefits or the payments of other players in the Grid [20].
To apply the Pareto principle, the process of coalition building will follow the
coalition and division rules [23].
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Definition of the coalition rule (merge): For a group of coalitions
S ¼ S1; S2; S3;⋯; Snf g, two or more coalitions decide to merge just if the profitability
increases (it reduces the power losses) of at least a Smart Grid, without affecting or
diminishing the profitability of the other members of the group N [23]:
Ukj¼1Sj
n o
⊳m S1;⋯; Skf g (16)
Definition of the division rule (split): A coalition S^ ¼ Ukj¼1Sj decides to be
divided into two or more disjoint coalitions if just a Smart Grid increases its profit-
ability (reduces the power losses) without affecting or diminishing the profitability
of the other members of the group.
S1;⋯; Skf g⊳s U
k
j¼1Sj
n o
2.3.2 Subroutine for the exchange of power
As in the initial subroutine the group N of the Smart Grid was classified, these
were split into buyers and sellers’ subsets where the coalition is expressed as
S ¼ Ss∪Sb. However, it may focus on several approaches to the distribution of
energy for the assignment of the sellers to the buyers. The approach outlined is the
preference of the buyers in the coalition.
The splitS with k buyers in Sb∪S, being Sb ¼ b1; b2; b3;⋯; bkf g, and buyers in SS ⊂ ,
being SS ¼ s1; s2; s3;⋯; sSf g, these groupswill act sequentially. An important consider-
ation is the local transfer of energymade by the seller and buyer before using the
substation.
Also, if a Smart Grid just buys or sells energy from or toward the substation, this
Smart Grid is left out of the GridN since it does not deliver any benefit to the coalition.
3. Simulation of the electric system based on the theory of games
The software Matlab 2017 and the data of the network of Figure 1 were used for
the simulation.
3.1 Input data
Table 1 shows the data entered in the simulator; they include the driver
resistance, link voltage, and the minimum threshold distance to build coalitions.
Table 2 shows the substation characteristics, such as, geographical location,
power, meter of energy losses for the transformer of the substation, and price of the
electricity in dollars perMW.
In Table 3, the data of 10 microgrids (MG) [24] that are composed of 6 buyers
(1) and 4 sellers (+1) are shown. Additionally, the location is given in Km by a
Cartesian coordinate system, power generated by the MG, energy demand by each
MG, and the price of electricity.
3.2 Analysis of the results
3.2.1 Noncooperative model
Table 4 shows the algorithm results for the noncooperative model. The energy
surplus is higher than zero Q i>0ð Þ, in which the Smart Grid has an energy surplus
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so that it can sell that power (seller). Likewise, it is observed that there are other
values of de Q i <0; consequently, in this case, some MGs need to buy energy from
another MG or directly from the substation. The value of Li is the power flow, that
is, the demanded power plus the power loss in the electric lines. Finally, there are
values of the power losses Pi0, and the individual payments Pi0.
3.2.2 Coalition building
When Smart Grids decide to build coalitions with its neighbors, the merger pro-
cesses and the application Pareto principle generate a stable coalition where the
Figure 1.
Base model.
Resistance [Ω/km] MT voltage [kV] BT voltage [kV] Threshold distance [km]
R Uo U1 Du
0.0147523 22 22 5
Table 1.
Data feeder.
N° Location [km] Power [MW] Loss constant Cost of energy [$/MW]
X Y
0 0 0 100 0.02 1
Table 2.
Macro station or substation data.
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members of each coalition can improve their payments. The evolution of the pay-
ments can also be observed and compared with the case presented in [24]. The
payments are shown in Table 5. In analyzing the payments concerning pattern [24],
these improve when the Smart Grids decide to build coalitions like those shown in
Figure 2.
It is noteworthy that like [24], it was not possible to improve the payment of the
Smart Grid 9, which was left isolated for the cooperative game and Pareto principle.
It would not represent any problem since it does not contribute any benefit to the
coalition’s members nor does it worsen the payments.
3.2.3 Power exchange in a cooperative game
Power exchange in a cooperative game incorporates the restrictions in the coali-
tion building, improving the algorithm presented for [24]. It carries an
N° Location [km] Power [MW] Demand [MW] Energy price [$/MW] State buyer: (1)
seller: (1)
X Y
1 1.8 2.6 0 152.2 1 1
2 1.6 4 56.6 0 1 1
3 1 3 45.4 0 1 1
4 2.8 3.3 134.3 0 1 1
5 4.7 0.4 0 35.4 1 1
6 3.4 2.8 42 0 1 1
7 3.5 4 0 33.2 1 1
8 1.4 0.6 0 60 1 1
9 3.8 3.2 0 68 1 1
10 2.8 2.2 0 140.9 1 1
Table 3.
Smart grid data.
N° Q i [MW] Li_optimo [MW] Pio [MW] Uii
1 152.2000 162.0883 9.8883 9.8883
2 56.6000 54.5463 2.1686 2.1686
3 45.4000 44.0290 1.4294 1.4294
4 134.3000 126.2559 8.9307 8.9307
5 35.4000 36.6394 1.2394 1.2394
6 42.0000 40.6068 1.4616 1.4616
7 33.2000 34.3907 1.1907 1.1907
8 60.0000 61.6978 1.6978 1.6978
9 68.0000 71.4586 3.4586 3.4586
10 140.9000 150.3462 9.4462 9.4462
Average of power losses for the noncooperative case is 4091 [MW].
Table 4.
Noncooperative state.
11
Reducing Power Losses in Smart Grids with Cooperative Game Theory
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88568
improvement of the reduced power losses. Table 6 shows the increases in the
payments of the members belonging to the grid.
3.2.4 Energy exchange in the grid
Finally, Table 7 shows the power bought to each MG and substation during the
process of energy exchange in the grid.
9.8883 5.7107
2.1686 1.2524
1.4294 1.4254
8.9307 5.2128
1.2394 1.2394
1.4616 0.7797
1.1907 0.6950
1.6978 1.6930
3.4586 3.4586
9.4462 5.0395
Table 5.
Vector payment evolution.
Figure 2.
The coalition formed for the cooperative game in the energy exchange.
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Seller i Buyer j Transferred power
[MW]MGi MGj Pij
Power purchased from
the substation [MW] Pj0
Power sold to the
substation [MW] Pi0
Coalition S1 1; 2f g
2 1 2.2507 — —
Substation 1 — 4.7124 —
Coalition S2 5f g
Substation 5 — — 1.2394
Coalition S3 4; 7f g
4 7 0.4390 — —
4 Substation — — 5.4688
Coalition S4 3; 8f g
3 8 2.7257 — —
Substation 8 — 0.3926 —
Coalition S5 9f g
Substation 9 — — 3.4586
Coalition S6 6; 10f g
6 10 0.6009 — —
Substation 10 — 5.2183 —
Table 6.
Power exchange in the distribution grid.
Purchase to MW Losses Transferred power
Coalition S1 1; 2f g
MG1 MG2 164.339 2.2507 162.0883
MG1 Substation 61.3124 4.7124 56.6000
Coalition S2 5f g
MG5 Substation 46.6394 1.2394 45.4000
Coalition S3 4; 7f g
MG7 MG4 134.739 0.4390 134.3000
MG4 Substation 42.1082 5.4688 36.6394
Coalition S4 3; 8f g
MG8 MG3 44.7257 2.7257 42.0000
MG8 Substation 34.7833 0.3926 34.3907
Coalition S5 9f g
MG9 Substation 65.1564 3.4586 61.6978
Coalition S6 6; 10f g
MG10 MG6 72.0595 0.6009 71.4586
MG10 Substation 155.5645 5.2183 150.3462
Table 7.
Energy exchange in the distribution grid.
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3.2.5 Average loss
Figure 3 shows that as N increases, the power losses tend to reduce. When N is
big in a smart grid, it has higher possibilities to find neighboring nodes to develop
the coalition process for cooperative exchange of energy.
Table 8 shows a significant power loss in the cooperative model compared to the
noncooperative. Thus, the study concludes that the average losses decrease by 38.62
when they join the MGs.
Figure 3.
Average power losses in a cooperative system vs. noncooperative.
N° MG Noncooperative Cooperative [%]
2 6.0622 3.2160 46.95
3 4.5179 2.6205 42.00
4 5.6211 3.6968 34.23
5 4.7448 2.6382 44.40
6 4.1976 2.4421 41.82
7 3.7680 2.4953 33.78
8 3.5092 2.3150 34.03
9 3.5036 2.4420 30.30
10 4.0979 2.4542 40.11
Table 8.
Payment evolution.
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4. Conclusions
The most outstanding conclusion in this chapter is the development of a coali-
tion building algorithm through the game theory to reduce energy losses in smart
grids, which are based on a conceptual new model within the same ones that
concentrate on the consumers and benefits if they decide to use the flexibility of
distributed generation grids.
The coalitions built between MGs could be very profitable if they were truly
allowed, and it they will encourage the consumers to participate and to take the next
step as prosumers, that is, to produce and consume energy at the same time.
The proposal presented allows the MG building coalitions to minimize the power
loss when the power is transmitted from an MG to another MG, to the macro
station, or to the nearest substation.
This study simplifies numeric calculations, by introducing certain heuristics to
the algorithm, through the approximation of the data that belongs to an ideal or
practical system. That is, a great coalition. among all the participants is not possible.
It can be seen that for similar distances between a buyer and a seller, and a buyer
and the substation, the power losses can end up being lower in the second case
than the first. This is because it is in the voltage level between the interconnection,
which is lower when two MGs are connected, instead that an MG and the
substation: U_1<U_2.
Concerning the theoretical pattern, the losses significantly decrease by intro-
ducing into the coalition building the right restrictions such as the correct selection
of neighbors (threshold distances), load priorities (distribution of power in the
coalitions), power flow, and limitation of the energy in Smart Grid.
About the theoretical pattern, the losses significantly decrease by introducing
appropriate restrictions into the coalition building, such as the correct selection of
neighbors (threshold distances), load priorities (distribution of power in the
coalitions), power flow, and limitation of the energy in Smart Grid.
Author details
Javier B. Cabrera1,2, Manuel F. Veiga2, Diego X. Morales1* and Ricardo Medina3
1 Smart Grid Research Group, Catholic University of Cuenca, Cuenca, Ecuador
2 AtlanTTIC, Vigo University, Vigo, Spain
3 Luis Rogerio Gonzalez Institute—Senescyt, Cuenca, Ecuador
*Address all correspondence to: dmoralesj@ucacue.edu.ec
© 2019 TheAuthor(s). Licensee IntechOpen.Distributed under the terms of the Creative
CommonsAttribution -NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc/4.0/),which permits use, distribution and reproduction for
non-commercial purposes, provided the original is properly cited. –NC
15
Reducing Power Losses in Smart Grids with Cooperative Game Theory
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88568
References
[1] Rheinisch-Westfä lische Elektrizitä
tswerke (RWE). Typical daily
consumption of electrical power in
Germany. 2005
[2] Arefifar SA, Mohamed YAI, El-Fouly
THM. Supply-adequacy-based optimal
construction of microgrids in smart
distribution systems. IEEE Transactions
on Smart Grid. 2012;3(3):1491-1502
[3]Niyato D, Wang P. Cooperative
transmission for meter data collection in
smart grid. IEEE Communications
Magazine. 2012;50(4):90-97
[4]Ochoa LF, Harrison GP. Minimizing
energy losses: Optimal accommodation
and smart operation of renewable
distributed generation. IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems. 2011;
26(1):198-205
[5] Kantarci B, Mouftah HT. Cost-aware
smart microgrid network design for a
sustainable smart grid. In: Proc. GC
Wkshps; 2011. pp. 1178-1182
[6]Meliopoulos S, Cokkinides G,
Huang R, Farantatos E, Choi S, Lee Y,
et al. Smart grid infrastructure for
distribution systems and applications.
In: Proc. 44th HICSS; 2011. pp. 1-11
[7]Deilami S, Masoum AS, Moses PS,
Masoum MAS. Real-time coordination
of plug-in electric vehicle charging in
smart grids to minimize power losses
and improve voltage profile. IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid. 2011;2(3):
456-467
[8] Vargas A, Samper ME. Real-time
monitoring and economic dispatch of
smart distribution grids: High
performance algorithms for DMS
applications. IEEE Transactions on
Smart Grid. 2012;3(2):866-877
[9] Costabeber A, Erseghe T, Tenti P,
Tomasin S, Mattavelli P. Optimization
of micro-grid operation by dynamic grid
mapping and token ring control. In:
Proc. 14th EPE; 2011. pp. 1-10
[10] Costabeber A, Tenti P, Mattavelli P.
A surround control of distributed
energy resources in micro-grids. In:
Proc. IEEE ICSET; 2010. pp. 1-6
[11] Tenti P, Costabeber A, Trombetti D,
Mattavelli P. Plug and play operation of
distributed energy resources in micro-
grids. In: Proc. 32nd INTELEC; 2010.
pp. 1-6
[12] Kirthiga MV, Daniel SA,
Gurunathan S. A methodology for
transforming an existing distribution
network into a sustainable autonomous
micro-grid. IEEE Transactions on
Sustainable Energy. 2013;4(1):31-41
[13] Li Z, Wu C, Chen J, Shi Y, Xiong J,
Wang AY. Power distribution network
reconfiguration for bounded transient
power loss. In: Proc. IEEE ISGT Asia;
2012. pp. 1-5
[14] Bouhouras AS, Andreou GT,
Labridis DP, Bakirtzis AG. Selective
automation upgrade in distribution
networks towards a smarter grid. IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid. 2010;1(3):
278-285
[15] Katic NA, Marijanovic V, Stefani I.
Profitability of smart grid solution
application in distribution network. In:
Proc. 7th MedPower; 2010. pp. 1-6
[16] Fadlullah ZM, Nozaki Y,
Takeuchi A, Kato N. A survey of game
theoretic approaches in smart grid. In:
Proc. IEEE WCSP; 2011. pp. 1-4
[17] Couillet R, Perlaza SM, Tembine H,
Debbah M. A mean field game analysis
of electric vehicles in the smart grid. In:
Proc. IEEE INFOCOMWorkshops;
2012. pp. 79-84
16
Advanced Communication and Control Methods for Future Smartgrids
[18] Zhang C, Wu W, Huang H, Yu H.
Fair energy resource allocation by
minority game algorithm for smart
buildings. In: Proc. DATE; 2012.
pp. 63-68
[19] Saad W, Han Z, Poor HV.
Coalitional game theory for cooperative
micro-grid distribution networks. In:
Proc. ICC; 2011. pp. 1-5
[20] Saad W, Han Z, Vicent PH.
Coalitional game theory for cooperative
micro grid distribution networks. In:
IEEE International Conference on
Communications Workshops (ICC);
2011
[21] Lena M. A merge and split
mechanism for dynamic virtual
organization formation in grid. IEEE
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems. 2014;25(3):3
[22] Saad W, Han Z, Poor HV.
Coalitional game theory for cooperative
micro-grid distribution networks. In:
IEEE Xplore; 2011. pp. 1-5
[23]Apt K, Witzel A. A generic approach
to coalition formation. International
Game Theory Review. 2009;11(3):
347-367
[24]Magaña Nieto A. TDX, 30 10 2015
[En línea]. Available from: http://www.
tdx.cat/TDX-0722109-095713
17
Reducing Power Losses in Smart Grids with Cooperative Game Theory
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88568
